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COMMENTS
VERNONIA CASE COMMENT:
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS LOSE THEIR
RIGHTS WHEN THEY DON THEIR UNIFORMS
Introduction
Drug use by school-age children is common throughout the
country from the mean streets of New York City to the country fields
of Iowa.] Reports show that approximately twenty-three percent of
youths between the ages of twelve and seventeen have used one or
more illicit drugs at some time in their life and forty-eight percent
have used alcohol. There is also growing concern about the numbers
of school children using performance enhancing drugs such as
anabolic steroids. 3  However, drug use is not limited to problem
students-in fact, student athletes are particularly susceptible to drug
4
use.
The Vernonia School District, in Vernonia, Oregon, realized
that its student athletes had a strong peer influence in the community
1 See generally Eugene C. Bjorklun, Drug Testing High School Athletes and the Fourth
Amendment, 83 EDUc. LAW REP. 913 (1993).
2 Id. at 913 (citing the 1990 survey by the NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE:
HIGHLIGHTS 1990). DHHS Publication No. (ADM) 91-1789, Washington, D.C., U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1991, at 13.
3 Id. at 914. The author cites recent studies by the Health and Human Services
Department which indicate that more than 250,000 adolescents have used steroids; about
262,000 high school students, or about three percent of all students have used steroids
and the vast majority of these users were in a competitive sport or weight lifting program
when they began using steroids. William E. Buckley et al., Estimated Prevalence of
Anabolic Steroid Use Among Male High School Seniors, 260 JAMA 3441, 3445 (1988);
Ellen Flax, 250,000 Teenagers Have Used Steroids, Number May be Growing, Studies
Find, 6 EDUC. WK., Sept. 19, 1990, at 6.
4 Charles Feeney Knapp, Drug Testing and the Student-Athlete: Meeting the
Constitutional Challenge, 76 IOWA L. REV. 107 (1990) (stating that not only does the
level of drug use by student athletes mirror the drug use by the general student
population, but student athletes abuse performance enhancing drugs, such as steroids,
more so than the general student population).
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and were also some of the more prominent drug users. 5
Consequently, the school district attempted to fight drug use in its
school system by instituting a random drug testing program for all its
student athletes. 6 However, one student athlete, James Acton, and his
parents, objected to the testing program, claiming it violated Acton's
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.7 They argued that under this program, every student athlete
is guilty of drug use until proven innocent by a random urinalysis.8
They filed suit and their case was heard by the United States Supreme
Court.
On June 26, 1995, the Court issued its decision in Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton.9 The Court held that a public school
may conduct random drug testing of its student athletes, by urinalysis,
in order to prevent drug use among the student body and minimize the
risk of injury to the student. The Court, in an effort to wage the war
on drugs, extended the constitutionality of random drug testing and
lessened the degree to which school childrens' constitutional rights are
protected. 1 The Court's intentions of ridding our schools of drugs
and providing school officials and students with a productive learning
environment is a noble one, but Vernonia may have set a very
dangerous precedent. The Court claims that Vernonia maintains the
Court's longstanding position that students do not "shed their
constitutional rights at the school house gate."'12 However, after
Vernonia, those rights are now shed in the locker room instead.
Part I of this Comment examines the background of Vernonia,
including a description of the drug testing program. Part II examines
the constitutionality of random drug testing that was set forth in two
earlier cases. Part II will also examine the Court's position regarding
5 Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2387 (1995).
6 Id. at 2387.
Id. at 2390.
Id. at 2405.
9115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
I d. at 2396.
See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). The Supreme Court previously
determined the constitutionality of random drug testing in these two cases.
12 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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students' Fourth Amendment rights. Part III describes how the Court
reached its decision in Vernonia. Part IV analyzes the critical issues
of the decision and provides commentary regarding the Court's failure
to objectively apply the law. Part V examines the possible
consequences of the Court's decision on students' constitutional rights.
L Vernonia
Vernonia began in late 1991 when James Acton was 12 years
old and enrolled in the seventh grade at Washington Grade School in
Vernonia, Oregon. 13 James signed up to play football for his school
and agreed to undergo the required examination which included a
urine sample. 14 When James attended the first football practice, he
received a consent form which permitted the school to test him for
drugs and alcohol. 15 The form required his parents' consent as well.' 6
James and his parents declined to sign the consent form because they
objected to the policy behind the drug testing program.' 7 They felt
that James should not be randomly tested for drug use in the absence
of any evidence that he had used drugs or alcohol. 18 However,
because students are precluded from participating in any district
sponsored athletics without consent,' 9 James was faced with an
ultimatum: either consent to the random urinalysis or forego playing
school sports.2°
The school district implemented the drug policy in response to
an increase in disciplinary problems which school officials attributed
to drug use.2 1 The glamorization of drugs and the growing drug
13 Acton v. Vernonia School District 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (D. Ore. 1992).
14 Id. at 1359 n. 1.15 id.
16 id.
"7 Id. at 1359.
18 Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1359.
19 Id.
20 id.
21 See id. at 1356-60. The principal of Vernonia's high school testified that discipline was
never a serious problem until the mid-1980s when teachers began noticing an increase in
the use of drugs and alcohol by students. Id. at 1356.
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culture caused serious disruptions to the educational process by
preventing school officials from providing the proper learning
22environment. Students were also getting involved in criminal
incidents, such as stealing alcohol from a store after a track meet,
carrying drug paraphernalia onto school grounds, and smoking what a
teacher believed to be marijuana at a cafe across the street from the
school .23
The school district initially attempted to attack this drug
problem by holding seminars and assemblies to illustrate the dangers
24of drugs and alcohol, but these efforts proved unsuccessful. School
officials believed the best way to combat the drug problem was to
prevent student athletes from using drugs and alcohol because they
felt the student athletes fueled the problem based on their prominence
as role models. 25 Finally, the school district proposed a drug testing
program which they felt would pass constitutional muster, and which
was unanimously ap roved by parents who attended a meeting to
discuss the program.
The drug testing program requires that all students who wish
to participate in school athletics sign a consent form authorizing the
27school district to conduct a random urinalysis. All student athletes
are tested at the beginning of each season and randomly tested on a
weekly basis during the season. Each student athlete's name is
22 See id at 1356-57. Students would use profanity during class and they had a "general
flagrant attitude that there was nothing the school could do about their conduct or their
use of drugs and alcohol." Id. at 1356. According to school officials, students
glamorized drugs and alcohol, shared stories in class about parties, came to class
inebriated or "high," and formed groups with names like the "Big Elks" or the "Drug
Cartel." Id.
23 Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356-57.
14 Id. at 1357.
25 Id. Student athletes are considered role models to many people in Vernonia because
Vernonia is a small town and the community takes a serious interest in the school
system's sports teams. Id. at 1356-57. The Court accepted the school district's contention
that preventing student athletes from using drugs and alcohol would deter other students.
Id. at 1363.
26 Id. at 1358. School district officials met with counsel and the decision was made, on a
belief that it was constitutional, to go ahead with the drug testing program. Id.
27 id.
28Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358.
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assigned a number and placed into a pool where ten percent of the
names are drawn each week by a student who is unaware of the
number's identity.29 Student athletes who are selected get tested one
at a time throughout the school day.
30
The test begins with selected students filling out a specimen
control form which assigns each student a number. 31 Each student is
32given a testing packet containing a cup and vial. The student then
enters a locker room where a school official is present.33 The school
official opens the packet and provides the student with a cup. 34 The
test differs for boys and girls.35 Boys produce the sample while
standing at a urinal with their backs turned to the monitor, while girls
produce their sample in an enclosed stall. 36 In both cases the monitor
listens for normal sounds of urination and then checks the sample for
temperature to prevent tampering. 37 The monitor then transfers the
sample into a vial and the student places a lid on the vial. 38 The vial
is sealed with tape and the student signs and dates it. 39 The vial is
assigned the number that coincides with the student's specimen
control form and is then sealed in a plastic bag which is also sealed,
signed, and dated by the student. 4 The student then completes the
specimen control form by verifying that the specimen is his or hers
and that the specimen and package were securely sealed in his or her
41presence .
The samples are sent to an independent testing facility which
tests for amphetamines, cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol, by
29 id.
30 id.
31 id.
32 Id.
33 Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358.34 Id.
35 Id. Boys are monitored by a male school official who stands 12-15 feet behind the
student while girls are monitored by a female school official who stands outside the stall.
Id.
36 id.
37 Id.
38 Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358.
39 id.
4 Id.
41 id.
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technicians who do not know the identity of the student providing the
42 43sample. The urinalysis is 99.94% accurate. The results are
telephoned to authorized Vernonia School District personnel.44
Positive results are also mailed to the district superintendent.45
If a student tests positive, a second test is given as soon as
46possible to confirm the results. Parents are notified if the student
tests positive twice. 47 If the second test is negative, no further action
48takes place. However, if the second test is positive, a hearing is held
with the student and his or her parents, and the student is given the
option of either participating in an assistance program and taking a
weekly drug test for six weeks, or being suspended from the athletic
program for the remainder of the current and the entire following
season. 49 The student is re-tested before beginning the next season for
which he or she is eligible. Although not specified in the policy, a
student athlete who commits a second offense may continue playing
sports if he or she submits to counseling and a weekly urinalysis.
5 1
Acton and his parents brought the action against the school
district challenging random drug testing as a requirement for
participation in interscholastic sports.: 2 The District Court held that
Vernonia's drug testing program was constitutional.53 On appeal,
however, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,
holding the drug testing program unconstitutional by claiming it
violated students' Fourth Amendment rights.54 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to end the dispute.
55
42 id.
43 Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358.
44id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358-59.
41 Id. at 1359.
50 d.
51 id.
52 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. 2386.
53 Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1365, 1368.
54 Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1994).
55 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2386.
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I. The Constitutionality of Random Drug Tests
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.
. . .,56 There may not be a more invasive procedure which interferes
with an individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures than a random drug test.57 The United States Supreme Court
determined the constitutionality of random drug testing by a
governmental entity in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n
58
and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.59 These cases
will be examined to understand the framework in which the Court
works and whether the Court's Vernonia decision was constitutionally
sound.
Skinner concerned the constitutionality of the Federal
Railroad Administration's ("FRA") drug testing regulation. The FRA
instituted a suspicionless drug testing program to prevent pervasive
drug and alcohol abuse within the railroad industry. 60  The drug
testing regulations provided that covered employees would have to
submit to blood and urine testing "upon the occurrence of certain
specified events" such as "a major train accident or an impact
accident ... [or] after any train incident that involves a fatality to any
on-duty railroad employee."
6 1
The railroad's drug test was described in Skinner: after a
major train accident, the railroad employees involved are taken to an
independent medical facility where blood and urine samples are
56 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617; Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Van Raab, 816 F.2d 170,
175 (5th Cir. 1987).
58 489 U.S. 602.
'9 489 U.S. 656.
60 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.
61 Id. at 609. A "major train accident" is defined as a train accident that involves (a) a
fatality, (b) the release of hazardous material accompanied by an evacuation or a
reportable injury, or (c) damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more. Id. An impact
accident is defined as a collision that results in a reportable injury, or in damage to
railroad property of $50,000 or more. Id.
19971
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obtained. The samples are then shipped to the FRA labs for
analysis. 63 The FRA relies primarily upon blood samples, but urine
samples are also necessary because drug traces may remain in urine
longer. 64
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab65 was decided
by the Court as a companion case to Skinner.66 Von Raab concerned
the constitutionality of the United States Customs Service's
("Service") drug screening program for employees seeking promotion
to certain positions within the Service. The tests were required for
positions in drug interdiction because these activities are "fraught
with obvious dangers to the mission of the agency and the lives of
Customs agents. 67 In addition, positions that required an individual
to carry a firearm required a drug test because "public safety demands
that employees who carry deadly arms and are prepared to make
instant life or death decisions be drug free." 68 Individuals were also
subjected to drug testing if they applied for positions that required
handling classified information because the individual could face
69
smugglers, the temptation of bribery, or the threat of blackmail.
The drug test required an employee to produce a urine sample
behind a partition or in a stall. 70 A monitor of the same sex would
listen for normal sounds of urination and dye would be placed into the
toilet water to ensure that the sample was not tampered with.7' The
sample would be inspected by the monitor, then packaged and
shipped to a laboratory where it would be tested for marijuana,
62 Id.
61 id at 610.
6 Id.
65 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
66 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
67 Id. at 660-61. Drug interdiction involves protecting the United States from drug
trafficking and smuggling of large quantities of illegal drugs into the country. Id. at 668-
71.
61 Id. at 661.
69id.
70 id.
71 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 661.
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72cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine. Here too, the
Court found the testing program constitutional.73
The Court set forth the framework for determining the
constitutionality of random drug testing programs in Skinner and Von
Raab. The Court first held that the drug test was subject to
constitutional restraints because it was administered by the
government or an agent of the government. 74  This is important
because the Fourth Amendment only protects individuals from
governmental searches.75 The Court held that the railroad company in
Skinner and the United States Customs Service in Von Raab were
both governmental actors thereby subjecting them to Fourth
Amendment restraints.
76
Next, the Court determined that a urinalysis is a search. 77 An
action constitutes a search subject to Fourth Amendment constraints if
it invades a privacy interest that society recognizes as reasonable.
Although urine is a waste product excreted by the body, the Court
nonetheless held that a urinalysis is subject to Fourth Amendment
restraints because "the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon
expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as
reasonable. ,
78
Because the Court held that a urinalysis is a search, it then had
to determine whether the Skinner and Von Raab drug tests were
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. "Reasonableness" is the
72 Id. at 662.
71 Id. at 678-79.
74 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614-615; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
75 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable
searches and seizures conducted by the government or government agents. Id.
76 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614-15; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (stating that a private party
administering a drug testing program would also be subject to Fourth Amendment
restraints if the government was so enmeshed in the private party's activities that the
private party would qualify as a government agent).
77 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
78 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (stating that collection and
testing of urine constitutes a Fourth Amendment search); see also Charles A. Palmer,
Drugs vs. Privacy: The New Game In Sports, 2 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 175 (1992) (claiming
that the United States Attorney General has supported the view that a urinalysis is not a
search because dispensing a waste product does not involve a reasonable expectation of
privacy, much like dropping your garbage off at the comer for trash pickup).
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standard measurement of the constitutionality of a governmental
search.79 In order for searches to be reasonable, they have historically
required a warrant based on probable cause. However, in certain
circumstances, where obtaining a warrant would be impractical or
frustrate the government's purpose for conducting the search, a
warrantless search may be considered reasonable. 80 In order for a
warrantless search to be considered reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, there usually must still be some form of probable cause
or reasonable suspicion to conduct the search. 81 However, if "the
privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be
placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion [or
probable cause], a search may be reasonable despite the absence of
such suspicion."
82
The Court found Skinner's facts to constitute a "special need"
because obtaining a warrant before drug testing a railroad employee
involved in an accident would be impracticable and the time delay
83could destroy evidence of intoxication. Likewise, the Court
79 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (1993) (noting that "[aiccording to the Court,
the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness"').
8" Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)
(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985))). Certain circumstances, or
"special needs" are those that "make the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable." Id. Some searches that do not require a warrant include, among other
things, automobile checkpoints in which searches for illegal immigrants, contraband, and
drunk drivers take place; railroad accidents (Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-25); drug
interdiction (U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976)); and public school
searches in the name of order (T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41).
81 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (stating that "[o]ur cases indicate that even a search that may
be performed without a warrant must be based, as a general matter, on probable cause to
believe that the person to be searched has violated the law"); see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
340-48 (holding that a warrant was not required due to its impracticability in the school
setting, and that search of a student's purse which took place only after the school official
witnessed the student violating school rules met the standard of "reasonable suspicion"
appropriate for schools).
82 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
83 Id. at 620. "Regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety ... presents
special needs beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual
warrant and probable cause requirement." Id. For instance, it is impractical to require a
warrant or probable cause at the scene of a train wreck because of the traumatic and
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determined that "special needs" existed in Von Raab because the
Custom's drug testing program was not designed for ordinary law
enforcement, and the mission of the Customs Service would be
compromised if it were required to obtain a warrant before making
employment decisions.
84
The Court had to determine whether the searches were
reasonable, despite any individualized suspicion or probable cause, by
deciding whether the privacy interests implicated by the search were
minimal, and whether an important government interest, furthered by
the search, would be jeopardized by requiring a probable
cause/individualized suspicion requirement.85 Thus, the Court weighs
the privacy interests of the individual with the government's important
or compelling interest in conducting the search.
86
The privacy implications of a urine test are great since the
procedures involve an excretory function and an analysis of urine.
87
Essentially, the privacy interest may be measured by the test's
intrusiveness weighed against the individual's expectation of
privacy.88 The Court, when analyzing the intrusiveness of a search,
will examine issues such as: how the test is conducted; how the
individual is monitored while providing the urine sample; what
substances the analysis looks for; who is privy to the results; and
whether there is disclosure of medicines. 89 Historically, monitored
urination has demanded a high level of privacy which was not easily
penetrable by the government. 9° The drug test involved in Skinner
dangerous nature of such a situation and because inaccurate testing results may occur if
there is a delay in testing the employees responsible for the accident, because any drugs
or alcohol may metabolize during the delay while obtaining a warrant. Id. at 623.
84 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666-68.
85 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (stating that "[w]hen the balance of interests precludes
insistence on a showing of probable cause, we have usually required 'some quantum of
individualized suspicion' before concluding that a search is reasonable ... [However,]
individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be
presumed unreasonable") (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560).86 See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670-73; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627-29.
87 Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 175.
88 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-28; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671-73.
89 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-19.
90 Id. at 617 (stating that "collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of
privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable," and that, "[t]here are few
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recognized the privacy interest of individuals by minimizing the
intrusiveness of the collection process. 9' Von Raab's test was also
designed to minimize intrusion of privacy interests. It only tested
"employees who have been tentatively accepted for promotion or
transfer to one of three categories of covered positions" by notifying
employees in advance of a scheduled sample collection; by forbidding
direct monitoring of the urination; by screening only for specified
drugs; and by testing accurately. 92  The Court also found that the
individuals to be tested had a lower expectation of privacy because of
the nature of their positions.93 Thus, the Court placed little weight in
the individuals' privacy expectations.
The Court, in analyzing the government's interest in drug
testing, held in Skinner that preventing drug use of railroad employees
in order to ensure the safety of the railroads was compelling. 94 The
Court reasoned that the covered railroad employees engage in work
that is, "fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a
momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences. '" 95
The Court even compared the situation with that of people who had
routine access to nuclear power. 96  The Court was concerned that
employees could "cause great human loss before any signs of
impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others." 97
activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine") (quoting Von
Raab, 816 F.2d at 175).
91 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626-27 (noting that the drug testing procedure in question
minimized the intrusion of privacy by foregoing direct observation of the individual while
he or she was providing the urine sample, and by the collection of the sample by non-
railroad employees in a medical environment).
92 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n.2.
93 For example, in Von Raab, the Court decided that "[c]ustoms employees involved in
drug interdiction, which requires that they carry firearms, have a diminished privacy
expectation because they must be fit and honest." 489 U.S. at 672. Cf, Skinner, 489 U.S.
at 627 (stating that "[t]he expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by
reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety..
..1).
94 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
95 Id.
96 Id. (citing Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988)).
97 Id. The Court emphasized the fact that the government interest ultimately lies in
avoiding human loss or catastrophic property or environment damage as a result of a drug
or alcohol-related accident. Id. at 607, 628.
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Likewise, in Von Raab, the Court concluded that the
prevention of illegal contraband, including illegal drugs, from
entering the United States, is a compelling governmental interest.
98
Because many Customs Service agents are responsible for the
prevention of these materials entering the country, their physical
safety and integrity may be challenged continuously. 99 "It is readily
apparent that the Government has a compelling interest in ensuring
that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have
unimpeachable integrity and judgment."' 00 This is the same interest
as stopping and searching travelers entering the country without
probable cause, "because of national self protection .... ,lo
In both cases the privacy interests of the employees were
minimized while the governmental interests were considered
compelling. In addition, the searches were reasonable despite the
absence of the probable cause or individualized suspicion because
either requirement would have impeded the government's interests.
10 2
The problem with all constitutional balancing tests, however, is that
judges inevitably apply their own set of values in resolving
constitutional issues. Invariably, the resolution of such issues is the
98 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668-70.
99 See id. at 669 (stating that "[alt least nine officers have died in the line of duty since
1974," and in addition, the integrity of Customs officers may be threatened by bribes and
their own ready access to contraband).
i ld. at 670.
lOId.
102 Id. at 665. The Court noted that it is a "longstanding principle that neither a warrant
nor probable cause, nor indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an
indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance." Id. In order to
determine the reasonableness of a particular search that seeks to serve "special
governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement," the Court must weigh
"the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interest to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in
the particular context." Id. at 665-66. See also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. "In limited
circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and
where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite
the absence of such suspicion." Id.
103 Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1988). Professor
Strossen discusses the problems with balancing tests in general as they are applied to all
638 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
product of subjective decision making.' °4 This type of decision
making, particularly with respect to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, is widely criticized as "illogical, inconsistent,
unprincipled, ad hoc and theoretically incoherent."' 
05
III. Searches and Seizures of Students
Up until this point this case, Comment has provided the
framework for a suspicionless drug test of an adult in the workplace.
The framework shifts however, when the subjects involved are
children because their constitutional rights are less than those of
adults.' °6 Additionally, there is a significant difference when the child
constitutional issues. Id. at 1183. Noting that there are three major problems with all
tests, she states as the first major problem:
[D]espite the superficially objective appearance of
these tests, no objective methodology exists for their
implementation. Even if the courts could assign some
objective value to each of the competing interests
involved in a constitutional controversy, it would still
be impossible to devise an objective way of
aggregating or comparing those incommensurable
values. In consequence, the execution of any
constitutional balancing analysis permits-indeed,
requires-judges to rely upon their personal values.
Id.
104 Id.; see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n.2 (expressing concern that particular
methods for conducting urinalysis might "carry the grave potential for 'arbitrary and
oppressive interference with the privacy and personal security of individuals' to which the
Fourth Amendment is sharply addressed") (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 554).
115 Morgan Cloud, Pragmatic, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory,
41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 205 (1993). Professor Cloud's article focuses on 'drawing
distinctions between pragmatic Fourth Amendment adjudication and formal Fourth
Amendment adjudication. Id.
106 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391. "Traditionally at common-law, and still today,
unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination-
including even the right of liberty in its narrowest sense, i.e., the right to come and go at
will." Id. But see T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-38 (stating that "[a] search of a child's person
or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search
carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of
privacy.").
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is attending school. °7  Here, the relationship between a student and
his or her school shapes the student's constitutional rights in a
different manner than that which occurs between an adult and the
government. 108
Students do not share the same level of constitutional
protection as adults do and are therefore more susceptible to intrusive
measures such as drug testing. 1°9 However, children in school do not
lose total protection because the Court has held that school officials
are subject to Fourth Amendment constraints because they are state
actors.' 0 The Court dispelled the argument that school officials stand
merely in loco parentis II over children by declaring school officials
subject to constitutional restraints. 1 2 However, while school officials
do not possess "parental power" over school children, they may
enforce "rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if
undertaken by an adult."' 3
A public school's interest is educating its students which
requires school officials to maintain an orderly and disciplined
environment." 4  As a result, the Court determined that searches in
schools are limited circumstances which permit circumventing the
"" T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333 (holding that the Fourth Amendment's "prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school
officials"); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503 (holding that the First Amendment is applicable to
the actions of school officials); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (stating that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to the actions of school
officials).
"" T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. In its effort to "strike the balance between the school child's
legitimate expectations of privacy and the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an
environment in which learning can take place," the Court observed that "the school
setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are
ordinarily subject." Id.
'09 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348.
I"0 ld. at 336-37.
Id. The Court defines loco parentis as "their authority is that of a parent, not the state,
and is therefore not subject to the limits of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
112 Id. at 336. Since school officials have been held subject to the First Amendment and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, they should be subject to the
Fourth Amendment as well. Id.
' Id. at 339.
114 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-40.
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warrant requirement.' 5  Instead, a school-sponsored search of a
student must meet a test of "reasonableness" which, in the school
context, is measured by "whether the ...action was justified at its
inception," and whether the search "was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place...
11116 117In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,1 searching a student's purse was
justified at its inception because a school official caught a student
violating school rules by smoking cigarettes on school grounds.11
8
Searching the student's purse was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances justifying the interference in the first place: searching
for cigarettes after witnessing the student smoking in violation of
school rules. The initial search for cigarettes revealed marijuana
paraphernalia." 9  This discovery gave rise to a second search,
whereupon marijuana was discovered.120
The Court in TL.O., however, failed to decide whether
individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness
standard it adopted for searches by school authorities. 121 The question
of whether suspicionless searches are permitted by school officials
was left to the Vernonia Court.
III. Vernonia
A. Are School Officials State Actors?
The Court first addressed the question of whether school
officials administering a random drug test are subject to the
constitutional restraints imposed on the government by the Fourth
I d. at 340-42. A warrant is not required by school officials before searching a student
suspected of violating school rules or committing a criminal act because it would interfere
with swift and informal discipline. Id. In addition, probable cause is not necessary
because it is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search. Id.
116 Id. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
117 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
11 Id. at 343-48.
11
9 Id. at 343.
120 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
2' Id. at 343 n.8.
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Amendment. 122 Relying on T.L.O., the Court held that because public
school officials have been deemed state actors subject to First
Amendment restraints 123 and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 124 they should be considered state actors
when engaging in searches and seizures, and thus, restrained by the
Fourth Amendment. 1
25
B. Is Obtaining Urine Samples a Search?
The next issue the Vernonia Court addressed was whether
testing the students' urine samples constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment.' 26 The Court followed Skinner and Von Raab in
reaching its conclusion that "state-compelled collection and testing of
urine, such as that required by the Student Athlete Drug Policy,
constitutes a 'search' subject to the demands of the Fourth
Amendment."'
27
122 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
123 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
124 Goss, 419 U.S. at 581-82 (due process for a student only requires an informal
discussion concerning the misconduct shortly after it has occurred).
25 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37.
126 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
127 Id. at 2390 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (stating that the Fourth Amendment
applies to obtaining physical evidence from a person)); see also Skinner 489 U.S. at 616
(citing U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973)). "Obtaining and examining the evidence
may also be a search, if doing so infringes an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. (citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. at 295;
Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 8; California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)). Blood
samples and breathalyzers, and the subsequent analysis of the contents have constituted
Fourth Amendment searches due to the physical intrusion and knowledge gained from the
analysis. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966); Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481 (1984));
see also Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 175 (stating that the passing of urine is an expectation of
privacy society recognizes as reasonable since "[t]here are few activities in our society
more personal or private than the passing of urine").
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C. Is the Drug Test Reasonable?
In order to pass constitutional muster, a search and seizure
subject to the Fourth Amendment must be reasonable.' 28 All the
circumstances surrounding the search and the nature of the search are
factors which must be considered in determining reasonableness.
29
Although a warrant is usually required for a search to be considered
reasonable, 130 a warrant is not required in cases where "special needs"
exist.' 31 The Court held that special needs exist in school, thereby
making warrantless searches possible.'
32
However, in the absence of a warrant requirement, some form
of probable cause or individualized suspicion is usually required for a
Fourth Amendment search to be reasonable. The search in T.L.O.,
although not requiring a warrant, was reasonable, but it was based on
individualized suspicion. 133 The Vernonia Court, however, declared
the urinalysis reasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion by
claiming that the Fourth Amendment does not impose probable cause
as an irreducible requirement. 134 Consequently, the constitutionality
of suspicionless searches, such as the random urinalysis in Vernonia,
128 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2390; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
129 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537
(1985)).
13 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2390 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619). Warrants cannot be
issued without a showing of probable cause. Id.
131 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66. "A search unsupported by
probable cause can be constitutional, we have said, 'when special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable."' Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,
873 (1987)).
132 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41 (stating that special
needs exist in school because requiring school officials to obtain a warrant would
interfere with a school's effort to maintain order by quick disciplinary reaction)).
131 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8 (stating that the Court was not addressing whether the
search would have been constitutional absent individual suspicion).
134 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560-61 ("The
Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.")); see also
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623-26; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-69. In both Skinner and Von
Raab the Court upheld suspicionless searches and engaged in a balancing test of the
individuals' privacy interests and the government's compelling interests in order to
determine if probable cause was impractical, and therefore not necessary, to make the
search reasonable. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623-26; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-69.
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does not require individualized suspicion to be considered
reasonable. 135  Instead, the reasonableness standard is based on
weighing the intrusion of an individual's privacy interest against the
government's compelling interest.136  If the individual's privacy
interests are minimized and the government's interest is compelling,
and the government's interest would be unduly interfered with if a
probable cause or individualized suspicion requirement is necessary,
then the search will be held reasonable in the absence of probable
cause or individualized suspicion.
137
D. Nature of the Privacy Interest
The Vernonia Court first determined whether student athletes'
privacy expectations were minimized. The Court determined that the
central point in Vernonia was that the students were children who
were committed to the temporary custody of the state.' 38 As a result,
the legitimacy of student's privacy expectations are, as the Court
states, "consistent with what is appropriate for children in school." 139
135 See, e.g., Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (stating that "[a]s we explicitly acknowledged
[in T.L.O.], 'the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of
[individualized] suspicion .... We have upheld suspicionless searches and seizures to
conduct drug testing .... ).
136 Id. at 2390-91 (judging reasonableness of a search by balancing intrusion of individual
privacy interests with "legitimate" governmental interests).
131 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391; see also Schaill by Cross v. Tippencanoe County
School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (9th Cir. 1988).
131 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391 (stating that T.L.O. held that public schools do not
merely stand in loco parentis, but rather have custodial and tutelary power over the
children which allows the school to "enforce rules against conduct that would be perfectly
permissible if undertaken by an adult").
3 Id. at 2392 (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 581-82 (stating that due process for a student
challenging disciplinary action only required an informal discussion between the teacher
and the student); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)
(holding that students' First Amendment rights may be infringed by school officials in
"prohibiting vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse").
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E. Privacy Expectations of Student Athletes
The Court addressed what may be the most controversial issue
of the analysis. The Court made a very contentious decision that
student athletes' privacy expectations are lower than the rest of the
student body. 14 The Court reached this conclusion based on the fact
that athletes must undress in front of each other and subject
themselves to the typical exposure that occurs in locker rooms.141
Vernonia's school locker rooms, like many schools, have open
showers, no individual dressing rooms, and some toilets do not have
partitions. 142 In addition, the Court claimed student athletes' privacy
expectations are lower because they chose to try out for the team, thus
voluntarily subjecting themselves to a higher degree of regulation than
the general student body experiences.143 The Court further attempted
to substantiate this claim by stating that student athletes must submit
to pre-season physical examinations, including urine samples. Also,
athletes must acquire adequate insurance and maintain a minimum
grade point average. 144 The Court concluded that student athletes are
analogous to the employees in Skinner and Von Raab whose privacy
expectations were minimized by choosing to work in a closely
regulated industry where there is an expectation of intrusion.
45
F. Character of the Intrusion
The Court continued to address the privacy expectations of
student athletes by analyzing the character of the intrusion. If the
intrusion is minimal then the expectation of privacy is weakened.
4 6
140 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2392.
141 Id. at 2392-93; see also Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318.
142 id.
143 id.
14 id.
141 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2393 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627; U.S. v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311, 316 (1972)).
146 See generally Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-26 (providing that where the intrusion is
minimal the privacy interests will not be afforded as much weight, and are, therefore,
vulnerable to being outweighed by a compelling government interest).
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The Court recognized that collecting urine samples intrudes upon "an
excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy.''
147
However, the Court found the invasion of privacy by the school
district's drug test negligible because the manner in which the sample
is produced is nearly identical to using a public restroom.1
48
The Court also examined the actual analysis of the urine
sample. 149  The Court emphasized that Vernonia's drug test only
tested for drugs and not other conditions such as pregnancy or
epilepsy. 150 Although James Acton argued that the test exceeds the
realm of privacy by requiring students to reveal any prescription
medications he or she is taking in order to ensure an accurate test
result, 151 the Court responded that it has never held that "requiring
advance disclosure was per se unreasonable."' 5 2  In addition, the
Court boldly stated that the urinalysis intrusion was not significant
because the consent form that student athletes must sign does not
require disclosure nor does the policy set forth or require the school
official to ask for this information at the time of testing.' 53 The Court
attempted to justify its reasoning by assuming that a student athlete
may be able to provide the information in a confidential manner, such
as a sealed envelope presented to the testing lab.
154
G. Nature and Immediacy of the Government's Concern
Because Von Raab and Skinner held that suspicionless drug
testing requires a compelling level of governmental interest, the
Vernonia Court held that the school district must also demonstrate a
147 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2393 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626).
148 Id.
149 id.
15 Id.
"5' Id. at 2394.
152 Compare Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2394, with Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672-73 (praising
the drug testing program's feature of not requiring disclosure).
153 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.
154 id.
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compelling interest. 155  The Court determined whether the school
district's interest in conducting random urinalysis is compelling by
examining the nature and immediacy of the concern, and the efficacy
of the means for addressing the concern. 156 The Court adopted the
contention that deterring drug use by the student population and
protecting the health and safety of student athletes are the nature of
the concern and constitute a compelling interest. 157  The Court
supported its decision by citing a number of studies and statistics
claiming that drug use by students and student athletes is harmful both
mentally and physically, and disruptive to the educational process. 
58
The Court claimed that the immediacy of the concern was as
compelling as disciplinary problems, which school officials linked to
drug use by students, and are an "immediate crisis of greater
proportion than existed in Skinner ... and of much greater proportion
than existed in Von Raab .... 159 Furthermore, the Court stated that
student athletes face immediate physical danger when using drugs.'
60
As for the efficacy of the means for addressing the problem of
drugs, the Court agreed that random drug testing of student athletes is
an effective measure for preventing injuries and ultimately depleting
the Vernonia school system of drugs. 16  The Court reasoned that
random drug testing was necessary because "a drug problem largely
fueled by the 'role model' effect of an athletes' drug use, is effectively
addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs." 162  The
155 Id. The Court claims that it is a mistake to think that a compelling interest is a "fixed,
minimum quantum of governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by
answering in isolation the question: Is there a compelling state interest here?" Id.
Instead the phrase "describes an interest which appears important enough to justify the
particular search at hand, despite factors which show the search to be relatively intrusive
upon a genuine expectation of privacy." Id.
156 Id. at 2394-97.
15' Id. at 2395.
158 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2395.
159 id. The Court agreed that drug use and the disciplinary problems associated with it
were as an immediate problem as ensuring railroad safety and protecting the lives of
Customs agents and the integrity of America's borders. Id.
160 Id. The Court cited to a coach's testimony in which he believed that a wrestler was
injured due to drug use. Id.
161 Id. at 2396-98.
162 Id. at 2395-96.
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Actons claim that testing should be based on individualized suspicion,
which is the least intrusive search, was rejected by the Court. The
Court stated that a reasonable search does not have to be the least
intrusive search. 163 The Court gave many reasons why it does not
favor individualized suspicion over random testing, such as:
individualized testing connotes a badge of shame, that there exists a
risk that teachers may arbitrarily subject troublesome students for
testing, and that teachers' duties would expand to that of the police.
'64
IV. Questionable Issues
Assuming that the Court's analysis of the law in Vernonia
properly construed the law as set forth in Skinner, Von Raab, and
T.L.O., the Court's reasoning and application of the facts raises
questions as to whether it was acting judiciously or was merely
politically motivated by the waging of the "war on drugs."
A. Individualized Suspicion or Probable Cause Requirement
The Court's questionable decision making began when it
addressed whether some form of probable cause or individualized
suspicion was required for the search to be reasonable in the absence
of a warrant requirement. 165 The Court claimed that there is "no
irreducible requirement of such suspicion," and proceeded to engage
in weighing the student athletes' privacy interests against the school
district's interests. 166 The Court showed the first signs of adjusting its
opinion towards a desired result.
Justice O'Connor, in her dissenting opinion, raised the issue
that "[throughout history,] mass, suspicionless searches have been
163 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2396 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629).
'64 Id. at 2396.
165 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391. Special needs exist in schools making the warrant
requirement unnecessary. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-42. Therefore, the question is raised
whether individualized suspicion is necessary. Id. at 340.
166 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
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generally considered per se unreasonable. ' 67  The only time an
exception has been made is when a "suspicion-based regime would be
ineffectual."' 168  Although a search may be reasonable despite the
absence of individualized suspicion or probable cause, "such an
individualized suspicion requirement [does not] place the
government's objectives in jeopardy, [and] the requirement should not
be forsaken."' 
69
The Court noted that requiring individualized suspicion places
the government's interest in jeopardy when it is required in the school
context. 70  The Court reasoned that teachers cannot be responsible
for detecting students who are using drugs, and this type of suspicion-
based testing would undoubtedly be arbitrary and accusatory.' 7'
However, requiring a suspicion-based regime does not put teachers in
the impossible position of detecting students who are using drugs and
is no more of an arbitrary process than the manner in which the school
district determined that there was a need for instituting a random drug
testing program.
The school district claims that teachers do not have to detect
students who are using drugs because those students make themselves
identifiable. 72  They also claim that the drug culture was causing
disruptions and discipline problems. 173 If this was true, then those
students who misbehaved and were disruptive made the job of
identification easy.174 They made themselves identifiable.' 75
67 Id. at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
168 id.
169 Id. at 2401.
171) Id. at 2391 (citing T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 340, 341).
171 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2396 (stating that the requirement of individualized suspicion
would place an undue burden on school officials and lead to arbitrary testing of
troublesome but not drug-likely students which could result in expensive lawsuits).
172 Id. at 2402-05.
17 Id. at 2388-89. "Along with more drugs came more disciplinary problems. Between
1988 and 1989 the number of disciplinary referrals in Vernonia schools rose to more than
twice the number reported in the early 1980s... Id.
174 See, e.g., id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor observed that
student drug use was so obvious that "[s]mall groups of students, for example, were
observed by a teacher 'passing a joint back and forth' across the street at a restaurant
before school and during school hours .... [S]till another student was observed dancing
and singing at the top of his voice in the back of the classroom." Id.
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A suspicion based regime would not lead to arbitrary testing
because it would be based on the same evidence presented to support
a random testing program. 176  The evidence consisted of school
officials' observations that a drug problem existed which was causing
disciplinary problems. 177 The school district instituted the program
based on these observations; therefore, there should have been no
reason to fear that a suspicion based program would be based on
anything other than the same observations by the school officials.1 78
Regardless, the Court failed to consider that even with disciplinary
problems in schools, "the situation is not so dire that students in the
schools may claim no legitimate expectations of privacy."' 
79
Even if requiring probable cause or individualized suspicion is
impossible in schools, the Court failed miserably when it balanced the
privacy interests of the student athletes against the school district's
•.180
interest in a drug free, productive learning environment. The Court
did not afford the student athletes' privacy interest enough weight
while it gave too much weight to the school district's interest.
B. Privacy Interests
Although the privacy expectations of students in school are
less than that of adults, the Court erred by relying on its own
subjective reasoning that student athletes have a minimal privacy
interest. The Court felt that the privacy interest was minimal because
school sports are not for the bashful as there is an element of
communal undress; students voluntarily subject themselves to a
higher degree of regulation by trying out for the team. The character
of the intrusion is minor because of the manner in which the sample is
175 id. at 2403.
176 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he great
irony of this case is that most (though not all) of the evidence the District introduced ...
plainly gave rise to reasonable suspicion-and thus . . . would have justified a drug-
related search under our T.L.O. decision").
117 Id. at 2389.
178 id.
19 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338.
18o Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
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obtained and the type of information the sample is screened for.'
88
Each of these reasons demonstrates that the Court's view of scholastic
athletics and adolescent socialization is outdated.
The Court was wrong to conclude that student athletes have a
lesser degree of privacy because sports involve an element of
communal undress.?82 While it is true that the locker rooms described
in Vernonia have open showers and some of the toilets do not have
stalls,' 83 there is no indication that student athletes are required to use
these facilities.184 Furthermore, it is inaccurate to claim that
scholastic sports are not for the bashful. Most high school students
and athletes do not shower at school, whether after gym class or after
scholastic sports.' 85 Pre-pubescent children and developing teenagers
are highly self-conscious and are more accustomed to privacy. 8 It is
apparent that the Court's reasoning is totally subjective and it is
unfortunate that it did not show any sensitivity towards teenage
insecurities. 87
The Court's decision that privacy expectations are lowered
because the students voluntarily participate in school sports is also
flawed.188 The Court reasoned that students who try out for the team
subject themselves to regulations not imposed upon the general
student population.189 The Court analogizes the student athletes withthe employees in Skinner.190 This is a questionable analogy, however,
'l Id. at 2392-94.
182 Id. at 2392-93.
' Id. at 2393.
184 See generally id.
185 See Dirk Johnson, Students Still Sweat, They Just Don't Shower, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
1996, at Al. This article confirms what many people who attended high school in the last
15 years know-most students do not shower at school. Id. Whether out of insecurity or
because of dirty facilities, most students would rather not subject themselves to
communal undress. Id.186 id.
187 Id. One football coach even commented that his players "go home, all muddy, so they
could have their privacy... Id.
188 See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336 (explaining that "the concept of parental delegation
as a source of school authority, is not entirely 'consonant with compulsory education
laws' (quoting Ingraham v. White, 130 U.S. 651, 662 (1977).
189 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
190Id.
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because grade point average requirements, for example, are "not the
sort of extensive government regulation[s] that [have] been found to
diminish the expectation of privacy of workers in high risk industries
or high security areas of the government."'19 1 Furthermore, children,
unlike the employees in Skinner and Von Raab, are required to attend
school, and athletics are considered an integral "part of the
,educational process; part of what tax dollars pay for." 1
92
Consequently, student athletes should not have a diminished
expectation of privacy merely because they voluntarily take advantage
of what a compelled process affords them: the opportunity to play
scholastic sports. 1
93
The Court's minimalization of student athletes' privacy
interests is also curious when compared with Skinner and Von Raab.
In Skinner, the Court held that the railroad employees had a
diminished expectation of privacy because they work in an industry
which is regulated to ensure the safety of the railroad employees and
their passengers' 94  The Court even acknowledged that the privacy
interests in Skinner were unique and should not be used as a blueprint
for other cases. 195 The privacy expectations in Skinner were lowered
because railroad employees are responsible for people's lives, for
property, and for the environment. 196 As a result of Vernonia, it is
191 Acton, 23 F.3d at 1525.
192 Id.
193 id.
194 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627. The health and fitness of employees is vital to ensuring that
there are no accidents which could kill or injure thousands of people at a time and result
in millions of dollars in damages. Id. at 628-29.
'9' Id. at 628.
Some of the privacy interests implicated by the
toxicological testing at issue reasonably might be
viewed as significant in other contexts, logic and
history show that diminished expectation of privacy
attaches to information relating to the physical
condition of covered employees and to this
reasonable means of procuring such information. Id.
196 Id. Privacy expectations are diminished because of the employer's participation in an
industry that is regulated to ensure safety. Id.
652 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
apparent that the Court believed that student athletes engage in
activities that pose similar threats as those in Skinner. 1
97
Similarly, in Von Raab, the Court held that the privacy
expectations of agents are lowered because of the nature of their
positions.19 8 Agents are expected to be drug-free in order to avoid
killing innocent people or themselves while in the line of duty.' 99
Therefore, the Customs Service must maintain a drug-free
200
environment with drug free agents. While the activities of a
Customs agent, such as monitoring the United States border for drug
smuggling, and those of a student athlete, such as playing football, are
quite different, the Court has decided that they are actually quite
similar, despite the fact that there has not been a single documented
drug-related injury in the history of the sports program in the
Vernonia school district.2°'
If the Court's logic is followed, members of the marching
band, debate team, and chorus should also expect a lowered
expectation of privacy because they too are involved in activities that
impose certain regulations that the general student population does
not have to follow. The fact that only student athletes are subjected to
the drug testing program undermines the Court's position that student
athletes should expect a lowered privacy interest due to their
voluntary involvement in a regulated activity.
The Court did an about face when it determined that student
athletes' privacy expectations were minimized because the character
197 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. "Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a
'closely regulated industry,' students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have
reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy." Id.
198 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671-73. The Customs agents are directly involved in the
interdiction of illegal drugs which requires that they carry firearms and possibly engage in
violent apprehensions of smugglers. Id. Therefore, they must be able to conduct their job
with a clear head, free of drugs and with the ability to make clear decisions. Id.
'99 id. at 670-71.
2oM See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670 (stating that "public interest demands effective
measures to bar drug users from positions directly involving the interdiction of illegal
drugs").
20 1 Brief for Respondent, at 6-7, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386
(1995) (No. 94-590).
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202of the intrusion was minimal. The Court found the intrusion
minimal because the manner in which the production of urine was
monitored was no different than urinating in a public restroom.2
0 3
The Court also found the information gained from screening the urine
204was minimal and not used for criminal purposes. However, once
again, the Court's reasoning is subjective and inaccurate.
The manner in which the production of the urine sample is
monitored is not like using a public restroom. While the urinalysis
does shield girls from direct observation since they urinate while
inside a stall, boys must stand at a urinal with a monitor about ten feet
behind them watching and listening for signs of tampering. 205 Having
a monitor stand behind while being compelled to urinate, and
knowing that the urine will be tested for drug use, is by no means the
same situation as a typical public restroom where people, who may or
may not be known to the individual, go about their business. 20
6
Furthermore, it appears that the Court no longer believes that
excretory functions demand the highest level of privacy as it claimed
in Skinner.2
07
The Court's attempt to justify a lowered expectation of privacy
for student athletes by claiming that the punishment is not criminal for
testing positive 208 is weak. While it may not be criminal, testing
202 In Skinner, the Court recognized that urine tests implicate privacy interests. Skinner,
489 U.S. at 617. Quoting the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Skinner Court
stated that "[tihere are few activities in our society more personal or private than the
passing of urine." Id. Conversely, Justice Scalia in Vernonia found that "the privacy
interests compromised by the process of obtaining the urine sample are ... negligible."
Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
213 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.204 id.
205 Id. (stating that these conditions are typical for a public restroom and therefore make
the student's privacy expectation negligible).
206 Acton, 23 F.3d at 1525 (stating that "[n]ormal locker room or restroom activities are a
far cry from having an authority figure watch, listen to, and gather the results of one's
urination").
207 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. "There are few activities in our society more personal or
private than the passing of urine . . . [I]t is a function traditionally performed without
public observation .... " Id.
208 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2405.
[A]ny testing program that searched for conditions
plainly reflecting serious wrong doing can never be
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positive is a badge of shame for a school child. If the school district
was serious about ridding its schools of drugs then perhaps it would
have provided authorities with test results or instituted harsher
punishments. Suspending a student-athlete for a season does not
prevent that student-athlete from pushing drugs and maintaining
his/her peer influence over other students.
The Court erred once again by holding that the school
district's interest in instituting the drug testing program was
compelling or even important enough to dispel the individualized
209
suspicion or probable cause requirement. Whether the school
district's interest was compelling or important depends on what the
true purpose was for instituting the random drug test. It appears that
the school district implemented the drug testing scheme to either:
prevent drug use by the student body; protect the health and safety of
the student athletes; or to reduce the disciplinary problems that school
officials believed were drug-related.
210
It appears the Court accepted the school district's contention
that they instituted the drug testing scheme to prevent drug use in the
school system and to protect the health and safety of student
athletes. 21 1 The problem with deterring drug use amongst the student
made wholly non accusatory from the students
perspective . . . and for the same reason, the
substantial consequences that can flow from a
positive test, such as suspension from sports, are
invariably-and quite reasonably understood as
punishment. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 2394-95. It is not clear whether the Court demands that the interest be
compelling or important. Id. The Court refers to the government's interest in Skinner as
"compelling," but then states that the phrase "compelling state interest" in Fourth
Amendment context really describes "an interest which appears important enough to
justify the particular search at hand in light of other factors which show the search to be
relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy." Id.
2H) Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
211 Id. at 2395.
Deterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is
at least as important as enhancing efficient
enforcement of the Nation's laws against the
importation of drugs ... [i]t must not be lost sight of
that this program is directed more narrowly to drug
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body, however, is that the methods used to undertake this noble effort
can be too broad.212
For similar reasoning, Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated
Independent School District213 invalidated a school district's drug
testing program, which subjected all students participating in any after
school activity. 2 14 Brooks held that the school district's purpose for
drug testing was not compelling because many of the activities did not
pose the same risk to the public like the activities in Skinner and Von
215Raab. More importantly, Brooks also found that because so many
students would be subjected to drug testing, the scheme acted as an
"across the board, eagle eye examination of personal information of
almost every child in the school district," and such a "global goal" of
deterring drug use was not compelling. 2 16 In Vernonia, approximately
sixty-five percent of the high school students and seventy-five percent
of the elementary school students participated in interscholastic
sports. These figures represent a majority of the children in the
school district. The Court in Vernonia even acknowledged that the
school district's goal must be undertaken with an eye of caution
towards subjecting too many students. 2 18
use by school athletes where the risk of immediate
physical harm ... is particularly high. Id.
212 See Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Ind. School Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 766
(S.D. Tex. 1989) (invalidating school district's drug testing program because the program
was too broad).
213 id.
214 Id. By expanding the drug testing scheme to all extra-curricular activities the school
"diluted its interest in protecting against the aggravated health and safety risks directly
associated with athletic competition . . . [and] introduced testing subjects whose
expectations of privacy are not diminished by the communal undress of locker rooms ...
See also Knapp, supra note 4, at 131.
215 Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 765-66; see also Robert C. Farley, Jr., Constitutional Law-
Suspicionless, Random Urinalysis: The Unreasonable Search of the Student Athlete-
Acton v. Vernonia School District 47J, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 439,449-52 (1995).
216 Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 765-66.
217 Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356.
218 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2395. It could be argued that the Court, by making this
statement, recognizes that the school district's true purpose for drug testing was to prevent
disciplinary problems and that drug testing student athletes is a perilously round-about
way of solving the problem rather than attacking it head on. Id.
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The school district's claim that their interest in drug testing
student athletes was also to ensure the health and safety of student
athletes is questionable. 219 It is doubtful that this interest could be
considered compelling, or even important, especially since the test
does not even screen for steroids and there has never in the history of
the Vernonia school district been a drug-related injury.220
Steroids pose a serious threat to the health and safety of
student athletes as they are one of the most prevalent and dangerous
drugs abused by adolescents and athletes. 22' A study in U.S. World &
News Report determined that approximately one million American
steroid abusers are adolescents. Children under the age of fifteen
years old are more likely than other groups to abuse steroids. 22' In
addition, 6.6% of all male high school seniors under the age of
224eighteen had used or were using steroids. The abuse of steroids has
not gone unnoticed by Congress, which enacted the Anabolic Steroids
Control Act of 1990 which made it a crime to use and distribute
steroids. 225  Steroids are often used, especially by adolescents, to
226enhance their appearance and/or to increase athletic performance.
The long term effects of steroid abuse are not easily ascertainable,
however, there are many side effects which are quite serious and
substantial. People who use steroids may develop acne, liver damage,
kidney failure, immune system deficiencies, and circulatory
219 See Eric N. Miller, Suspicionless Drug Testing of High School and College Athletes
After Acton: Similarities and Differences, U. KAN. L. REV. 301, 313 (1996). The author
states that "[tihere is some controversy about whether the school district's stated goals
were actually the true goals of the drug testing policy." Id. Specifically, Vernonia's
policy "did not include testing the athletes for anabolic steroids." Id.
220 See Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1361. The school district's drug testing program only
screens for marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, and possibly LSD. Id. at 1358; see Brief
for Respondent, at 6.
221 Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358.
222 George Fan, Anabolic Steroid and Human Growth Hormone Abuse: Creating an
Effective and Equitable Ergogenic Drug Policy, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 439, at 439 n.3
(1994) (citing Joannie M. Schrof, Pumped Up, 112 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 55 (June 1,
1992)).
223 Id. at 439 n.3-4.224 id.
225 Id. at 439-40.
226 John Burge, Legalize and Regulate: A Prescription For Reforming Anabolic Steroid
Legislation, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 33 (1994).
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problems.227 In addition, steroid use will reduce sperm production,
cause testes to shrink, alter the sex drive, cause infertility, male breast
development, and male pattern baldness.
228
These effects are dangerous for any user, but for adolescents
they are especially damaging because, in addition to the effects just
mentioned, adolescents may suffer premature epiphyseal closure of
229long bones of their body which leads to growth stoppage. On a less
serious scale, users of steroids suffer more sprains and tears because
their tendons and ligaments cannot handle the increase in weight and
mass of the body. 230 Lastly, steroids may adversely affect a user's
psychological well being by making the user irritable, extremely
confident, paranoid, and in many instances, prone to violent outbursts
commonly referred to as "Roid Rages."
231
If the school district's interest was to ensure the health and
safety of their student athletes, as purported, they would test for
steroids due to their abundance amongst adolescents, the health risks
they pose to the user and his opponent, as well as the fact that high
school athletes are more likely to use steroids than other recreation
232drugs.since steroids actually enhance athletic performance.
The facts of the case, including the failure to test for steroids,
suggest that the school district actually instituted the drug testing
scheme in order to reduce disciplinary problems caused by drug use.
"The administration was at its wits end and ... a large segment of the
student body, particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics,
was in a state of rebellion. Disciplinary problems had reached
I ...233
'epidemic proportions.. Students were acting out and causing
disruptions, and the officials felt that if they could prevent drug use by
students, the outbursts and disruptions would cease. 34 They felt that
227 Fan, supra note 222, at 448-51.
228 id.
229 Id. at 451.
230 id.
231 Id. at 451.
232 Fan, supra note 222, at 443.
233 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2389 (quoting Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1357).
234 See generally id. (stating that "a three-fold increase in classroom disruptions ... led
the administration to the inescapable conclusion that the rebellion was being fueled by
alcohol and drug abuse").
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in order to accomplish this they would have to prevent the student
athletes from using drugs, because these students were the role
models and leaders, as well as key players in the drug problem.
2 35
However, instituting a random drug testing scheme to fight
disciplinary problems, prevent injuries, and cut down drug use by the
student population, are arguably not compelling governmental
interests when compared with what the Court considered compelling
23623governmental interests in Skinner and Von Raab.237
The Circuit Court, however, did not believe that the facts of
Vernonia constituted a compelling interest as in Skinner and Von
238Raab. The Circuit Court claimed that the school district's interests
were "not minimal ... [and] are worthy goals ... [but] worthy as they
are, they suffer by comparison to the kinds of dangers that have
existed when random testing has been approved. ' 239 The difference in
the decisions of the Circuit Court and Supreme Court reflects how
intent the Supreme Court was to create a politically correct decision.
Lastly, it appears that in determining whether the school
district's interests in conducting a random urinalysis was compelling,
235 Id. at 2388-89 (stating that student athletes were "admired in their schools and in the
community" and that they "were the leaders of the drug culture").236 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628-30. Skinner involved activities that were fraught with
danger to both the employees and innocent people. Id. In Skinner, protecting the safety
of the railroads by ensuring a drug free environment was considered compelling. Id.
Numerous studies showed that from 1972-83, there were at least twenty-one train
accidents involving alcohol or drug use which resulted in twenty-five fatalities, sixty-one
non-fatalities, and an estimated twenty-seven million dollars worth of damages. Id. In
addition, there were seventeen fatalities to employees that were drug or alcohol related.
Id. Furthermore, some of the accidents endangered the environment by causing
hazardous materials to be released. Id. Compare Vernonia, where the drug testing
scheme may very well have been implemented as a result of disciplinary problems related
to drug use, with Skinner, and it is clear that the Court is giving too much weight to the
school district's claim that their interest is compelling. Id.
237 See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670-71. In Von Raab, making sure that Customs agents
who carry firearms and engage in drug interdiction are drug-free was deemed a
compelling government interest. Id. Again, compare Vernonia with Von Raab, showing
how the Court gave too much deference to the school district. Id.
238 Acton, 23 F.3d at 1526. It appears that the Circuit Court gave great weight to the fact
that compellingness has to do with the context of serious safety concerns. Id. at 1524.
239 Acton, 23 F.3d at 1526 (stating that "[t]he prospect that an athlete might hurt himself
or a competitor is real enough, but it is not a risk of the same magnitude as an airplane or
train wreck ... or nuclear power plant disaster").
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the Court gave great deference to the District Court's findings which
were highly debated by the parties.
The District Court determined whether the school district had
a compelling interest from examining the facts of the case, more
specifically, the extent of the drug problem and its effects on the
district. However, these facts were hotly contested:.4 For instance,
there was testimony regarding an incident where students were
observed sharing, what the teacher believed to be a marijuana
cigarette at a restaurant; 24 1 drug paraphernalia was confiscated on
school grounds; 242 and on one occasion students admitted to a coach
243that they had used marijuana. Other school officials testified that
some athletes were arrested for using drugs at a party during school
hours and a football/wrestling coach testified that he suspected one of
his wrestlers had gotten hurt as a result of drug use and he also
suspected drug use by some of his football players due to their failure
244to execute well-rehearsed plays.
However, the Actons claimed that the school district's
evidence, including the above examples, were nothing more than
subjective perceptions and hearsay. For example, the Actons
claimed that only one of the teachers who testified at trial reported
246actually seeing a student take drugs. Even this claim was distorted
because the teacher's claim that students were passing marijuana
cigarettes to each other was based on the teacher's observation from
across the street.247 The teacher could not tell whether the students
were athletes, and the teacher could not explain how she knew the
students were passing marijuana cigarettes and not tobacco
cigarettes.
248
240 See Brief for Respondent, at 2-4.
241 See Brief for Petitioner, at 5, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386
(1995) (No. 94-590).
242 See Brief for Petitioner, at 5.
243 Acton, 796 F. Supp at 1356-1357; see also Brief for Petitioner, at 5.
244 Brief for Petitioner, at 6-7.
245 Brief for Respondent, at 5.
246 Id. at 4.
247 id. at 4-5.
248 Id. at 4 n.4.
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Another example was testimony by the wrestling coach who
claimed that in his opinion a wrestler was hurt as a result of drug
use. 249 The Actons claimed that the coach based his testimony on an
incident in which he entered the injured wrestler's room, a day after
the wrestler was injured, and smelled marijuana. 250 Consequently, the
coach opined that because he smelled marijuana, the wrestler must
have competed while "high" and suffered an injury as- a result.51
However, the coach's opinion, which was based on an incident that
occurred after the wrestler was injured, is not conclusive evidence of
whether the wrestler competed "high" or even that the wrestler was
smoking marijuana in his room- since there were other students in the
room at the time the coach entered it. 252  The coach could only
conclude that someone was smoking marijuana. 253 Most importantly,
the Actons stated that there was not a single drug-related injury in the
history of the athletic program 254 which the school district confirmed
in a pre-trial interrogatory.
255
While student behavior may have degenerated, the evidence
was not conclusive that students were actually using drugs or that
drugs caused them to behave poorly. 256  The evidence presented
consisted of a few incidents involving drugs and alcohol and school
officials' beliefs and opinions. 257 Although the Court gives extreme
258deference to school officials' determinations,, those determinations
should have been examined more closely when individuals'
constitutional rights are at stake.259
249 ld. at 6-7 n.8.
250 Brief for Respondent, at 6-7.
251 id.
252 Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1357.
253 Brief for Respondent, at 7-8.
254 Id. at 6.
255 id.
256 id.
257 Id. at 2.
258 Charles Palmer, Drugs vs. Privacy: The New Game In Sports, 2 MARQ. SPORTS L.J.
175 (1992).
259 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2407 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor states, "It cannot be
too often stated that the greatest threats to our constitutional freedoms come in times of
crisis." Id.
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V. Conclusion
The Court has erred in deciding that student athletes may have
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures sacrificed in the name of the war on drugs. While the
Court followed the proper framework, it was too subjective in its
application of the facts. Because Skinner and Von Raab are so
instrumental in laying the foundation for the legal analysis, the Court
should have more carefully compared the facts and refrained from
injecting its subjective analysis. It is difficult to reconcile a situation
where drug use by an employee could likely cause catastrophic
damages, including death and environmental hazards, with that of a
seventeen-year-old who may play a sport while under the influence
and is, in reality, only putting him or herself at any risk. In any event,
the school district is apparently not as concerned with the athletes'
health risks as it might appear since the test does not screen for
steroids. While this case Comment does not in any way condone drug
use by adolescents, it does recognize a substantial difference between
situations like those in Skinner and Von Raab, and a typical high
school athletic program.
The Court also fails to recognize Brooks which prevents
260
subjecting most of the student population to the testing. In
Vernonia, like many school districts, a large population of students
participate in interscholastic sports. Singling out the athletes may, in
some schools, be no different than drug testing most of the student
body. In addition, if the school feels that athletes are leaders and role
models and can influence the drug usage, the school should test the
class president and students in other leadership positions.
Most importantly, the Court overlooked the essential
requirement of some form of probable cause/individualized suspicion
unless it is unworkable. It is certainly not unworkable to discipline
261students who misbehave whether they are on drugs or not.
By allowing random, suspicionless testing on student athletes,
the Court has further opened a door for reducing rights of students.
260 Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 765.
261 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2407 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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From this decision it is foreseeable that the Court could declare it
constitutional to drug test students before they can attend a field trip
because of health and safety reasons. In fact, some school districts
have recently begun administering breathalyzers before admitting
262students into student events such as the prom. Perhaps schools will
start drug testing or breathalyzing students who drive to school and
park their cars on school property or take the school bus. It is not
unreasonable to assume that the realm of students subject to testing
will be expanded to include those who participate in other activities
besides athletics, and soon after may be expanded to test all students
who attend school. The Court's reasoning makes it very possible to
foresee the expansion of drug testing to all students. Unfortunately,
the Court, in its rush to wage the war on drugs, has committed what
Justice O'Connor considers a grave mistake: threatening our
constitutional freedoms by hysterically overreacting in times of
crisis.
263
Jonathan M. Ettman
262 Tim Golden, Before the Dance, a Sobriety Check, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 10, 1997, at A]2.
263 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2407.
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